We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The mechanism incorporates two important features of negotiations; players can revise claims in an attempt to reach a compromise or pursue their claims in an ultimate take-itor-leave-it o¤er. Players restrain their claims to avoid a weak bargaining position or their resistance to uncompromising behavior to acquire leadership. The Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are implemented in the extreme cases when respectively no and all revisions are allowed.
Introduction
Negotiations often share the following two features. First, players revise initial claims in order to reach a compromise. Their ability to make revisions depends on the context of the negotiations and may di¤er among players. Second, concessions may be induced by the threat of an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. However, negotiators discourage such uncompromising behavior by adopting a …rm posture -threatening to walk away from negotiations without agreement -when facing such an ultimatum. These two features are extensively discussed in the negotiation literature (Sebenius 1992 , Lewicki et al. 1994 ) and also appear in practical guides for negotiators, as in the defense procurement and acquisition guidelines by the US Department of Defense: 1 "Aim high" but "Give yourself room to compromise" and "Be willing to walk away from or back to negotiations".
In the bargaining literature, Harsanyi (1977) justi…ed the solution of Nash (1950) by comparing the risk limits of players in the pursuit of their claims. A player's risk limit is the highest probability of disagreement that he would accept in the pursuit of his claim in an ultimatum, when accepting his opponent's claim is the alternative. The player with higher risk limit is in a weak bargaining position and is more likely to accept his opponent's claim. Since a lower claim decreases the own risk limit and increases the opponent's risk limit, players avoid a weak bargaining position by exhibiting restraint in the formulation of their claims. Risk limits are equalized if each player claims his payo¤ in the Nash solution. Moulin (1984) justi…ed the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) in an auction in which each player bids a probability of disagreement when an uncompromising opponent pursues his dictatorial outcome in an ultimatum. The player with the lower bid is given the advantage to propose any feasible utility allocation as a compromise. Hence, the competition for …rst-mover advantage rewards restraint in the choice of resistance probabilities against uncompromising behavior. In a maxmin equilibrium of the bidding strategies, both players commit to equal resistance probabilities which eliminates …rst-mover advantage. They both propose the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in which they reduce their claims in the same proportion. In particular, this solution solves the trade-o¤ for each player between the commitment to higher resistance in order to deter uncompromising behavior and the commitment to lower resistance in order to obtain a leadership position.
In his justi…cation of the Nash solution, Harsanyi assumed that claims cannot be revised, leaving little room to compromise. In his justi…cation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Moulin assumed that players pursue their dictatorial outcomes in an ultimatum, excluding restraint in the formulation of claims. The two approaches motivate the analysis of a mechanism with four stages showing how avoidance of a weak bargaining position and competition for …rst-mover advantage interact. Players start by making claims, as in Harsanyi. In the second stage, players bid resistance probabilities, as in Moulin. Leadership is acquired by the player with the lowest bid. In the third stage, the leader proposes a compromise within the set of feasible compromises which depends on his claim but remains beyond his control in all other respects. In the …nal stage, the follower accepts or rejects the compromise. If he rejects, then he obtains his claim in an ultimatum unless he meets resistance to which the leader is committed by the second stage; the negotiations end in disagreement with the leader's resistance probability.
The single distinguishing feature of these games is the extent to which claims can be subsequently revised. The revision procedure de…nes the Pareto-e¢ cient maximal revision of each player's claim. The room to compromise is the gap between the maximal utility which a player can give to his opponent in the maximal revision and in the pursuit of his claim. The Nash solution and the Kalai is the new concept of the extended Nash product of a player's claim, which multiplies his claim with the opponent's utility in his maximal revision. The player with the larger extended Nash product of his claim is the strong player as he needs a lower resistance probability to impose his maximal revision which avoids an ultimatum. In particular, players face a trade-o¤ between claiming more so as to achieve more in an ultimatum and claiming less so as to obtain a strong bargaining position. This allows us to analyze how the aforementioned features in the negotiations literature play out in equilibrium. Players should not only aim high when formulating claims, but also leave su¢ cient room to compromise in order to obtain a strong bargaining position.
The paper shows that in equilibrium there is interaction between both strategic justi…cations in intermediate revision procedures, with two exceptions. Players restrain their claims which makes them equally strong, as in Harsanyi, but at the same time they restrain their resistance so that their concessions stand in the same proportion to their claims, as in Moulin. We distinguish between two cases. In the …rst case, maximal The mechanism underlines that room to compromise is essential for a strong bargaining position, as recommended in the negotiation literature. When a negotiator is able -for a claim below his maximal claim -to increase his opponent's payo¤ in his maximal revision, larger extended Nash products improve his bargaining position allowing for a better deal. A negotiator gains in equilibrium by facing fewer restrictions regarding the revisions of all claims below his maximal claim. Still, such exogenous restrictions can be important in particular contexts. For example, restrictions on revisions can be explicitly speci…ed in the mandate given to the negotiator by his principal or arise from costs of revising initial plans. The restrictions may also arise from unful…lled expectations raised by the initial claims or from aversion to making concessions.
In these examples, one expects better agreements for negotiators who do not fear to disappoint their principals or suppress their frustration. Our analysis sheds light on this, evaluating more generally the impact of revision procedures on the bargaining outcome.
The mechanism also clari…es the role of ultimatums with endogenously chosen risk of disagreement needed for imposing a compromise. This is further illustrated for unrestricted revisions in the alternating-o¤er game (Rubinstein (1982) ). In each round the responder can stop negotiations in an ultimatum and the proposer needs time to build resistance in order to deter such ultimatum for a better deal. The introduction of ultimatums moves the equilibrium outcome away from the Nash solution -the equilibrium solution of the alternating-o¤er game with equal waiting times -towards the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution -the equilibrium solution of the four-stage mechanism with unrestricted revisions.
Related Literature According to Nash (1953) , the relevance of a solution concept is enhanced if one arrives at it from very di¤erent points of view. The Nash program, as reviewed in Thomson (2010) , attempts to complement the axiomatic properties of solution concepts with non-cooperative foundation. While Harsanyi (1977) , Moulin (1984) , Binmore et al. (1986) and Howard (1992) implement the Nash program for a single bargaining solution, we achieve implementation for a family of solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium, as Miyagawa (2002) and Anbarci and Boyd (2011). Miyagawa's mechanism implements any solution that maximizes a welfare function belonging to a set of quasi-concave functions, including the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The second player counters the o¤er of the …rst player, but this o¤er is restricted to provide the same aggregate welfare as the …rst o¤er. In the mechanism of Anbarci and Boyd, compatible utility allocations are implemented in a …rst stage and incompatible utility allocations are implemented with equal probability in a second stage, unless there is an exogenously imposed probability of disagreement. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique robust solution which both players demand above a threshold. There is no general robustness ranking for other solutions. We propose a mechanism with endogenously chosen probability of disagreement which occurs only o¤ the equilibrium path and which induces restraint in the claims depending on the revision procedure. Interestingly, we …nd the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for two opposite extremes.
By considering intermediate revision procedures, we are able to compare and deepen our insight in Harsanyi's and Moulin's seminal contributions to the Nash program.
Schelling (1956) discusses take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and commitments as strategy devices. Kahneman and Tversky (1995) show that loss aversion appears as concession aversion in the context of negotiations. The experimental literature shows that people accept losses by rejecting unfair outcomes in ultimatums (Camerer (2003) ). Punishing unfair treatment is rationalized in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . We refer to this literature to justify the commitment of accepting the loss of disagreement with positive probability in an ultimatum.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section de…nes the bargaining problem, the four-stage mechanism and the revision procedures. Section 3 analyzes the extreme revision procedures allowing no or all revisions. Section 4 characterizes the solution for intermediate revision procedures. We provide examples of revision procedures in section 5. Before concluding, the robustness of the mechanism is analyzed in section 6. The complete description of the subgame-perfect equilibrium and proofs are given in appendix.
The model
In this section, we de…ne the bargaining problem and a mechanism for selecting a solution in the bargaining set. The elements of S are the normalized utility allocations u = (u 1 ; u 2 ) associated with feasible outcomes, which are known by each player. For i 2 N , the concave function
The bargaining problem
Sg is assumed to be strictly decreasing. It takes the value u P i (0) = 1 in the dictatorial outcome of player i and the value u P i (1) = 0 in the dictatorial outcome of player i. The utility allocation in disagreement is (0; 0).
It follows that the set S de…nes a strictly comprehensive bargaining problem. The set of Pareto-e¢ cient utility allocations in S is the Pareto frontier P O(S) f u 2 Sj u 2 = u P 2 (u 1 )g.
The mechanism
The extensive form of the mechanism for selecting a solution in S has four stages. 
and i 2 N:
The revision procedure is beyond the control of the players and the single distinguishing feature of each mechanism with extensive form . All comprehensive revision procedures are collected in the set M. We index the extensive form for special comprehensive revision procedures. In H , as in Harsanyi (1977) , no revisions are allowed and each player's payo¤ in his maximal revision is equal to his claim, that is, Moulin (1984) , unrestricted maximal revisions of any claim yield the payo¤s of the opponent's dictatorial outcome, that is
The set of player i's compromises is
We assume for tractibility that a leader can also propose those compromises which are feasible for the follower. 2 Hence, the set of feasible compromises is
Claims are incompatible if p = 2 S. Maximal revisions are incompatible if for incompat-
The resistance probabilities in the second stage serve a double purpose as well.
While q i is player i's choice of the probability of disagreement when he is leader and his opponent rejects his compromise in an ultimatum, it also rewards lower resistance with …rst-mover advantage. In case of equal bids, leadership is assigned to player 1 for some labeling of the players. This rule is a mapping M ! f1; 2g which we de…ne in De…nition 3. Hence,
The rules of the mechanism can be summarized as follows:
Stage 2: All i 2 N bid resistance probabilities q 2 D.
Stage 3. The leader L(q) proposes the compromise c 2 C (p).
Stage 4: The follower F 2 N n fL(q)g chooses R2 fY,Ng.
The payo¤s for player i 2 N are
3 Two extreme revision procedures
We start by showing that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Nash solution can be implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in mechanisms with the same extensive form, but with di¤erent procedures for revising claims. All revisions are allowed for the former and no revisions are allowed for the latter. The non-cooperative justi…cations of these solutions recast the arguments of Moulin (1984) and Harsanyi (1977) respectively. 2 This assumption is relaxed in section 6. In all the mechanisms, we exclude upward revised claims (m i i (pi) > pi) and ine¢ cient revisions (m i i (pi) < u P i (pi)). We also ignore comprehensive bargaining problems which are not strictly comprehensive. Such extensions would only change strategies without changing the allocation implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) proposed the Pareto-e¢ cient allocation u KS (p) for which
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
as a solution to the reduced bargaining problem
We call u KS (p) the proportional solution of S (p). In this solution, the concessions are proportional to the claims and the payo¤s are increasing in the own claim. The mechanism M with unrestricted revisions provides a non-cooperative justi…cation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of S. Following Moulin (1984) , bidding
corresponds to a maxmin strategy for player i 2 N . To see this, consider the resistance probability q i of player i in stage 2. If player i leads the negotiations (i.e. q i q i ),
knowing that his opponent rejects any compromise with payo¤ below (1 q i )p i in stage 4, he proposes the Pareto-e¢ cient compromise
. If the opponent leads the negotiations with bid q i (i.e. q i q i ), then
(1 q i ) p i is player i's payo¤. Since q i q i ; player i's payo¤ as a follower is bounded from below by (1 q i ) p i . Hence, min c i i (q i ); (1 q i ) p i is a lower bound for his payo¤ when bidding q i . As higher resistance probability increases his payo¤ c i i (q i ) as leader, but decreases his payo¤ (1 q i ) p i as follower, the minimum of the two payo¤s reaches a maximum when Proof. See appendix.
The Nash solution
The solution u N of Nash (1950) to a bargaining problem maximizes the Nash product u 1 u 2 for u 2 S. Harsanyi (1977) derived the Nash solution as an equilibrium for a demand game in which, according to the conjecture of Zeuthen (1930) , the player with the higher risk limit is in a weak bargaining position and eventually makes concessions.
For player i's positive claim p i and his opponent's compromise c, his risk limit is de…ned
In our setting, the risk limit stands for the highest resistance probability that a follower in stage four would be willing to face in the pursuit of his claim when accepting the compromise c is the alternative. In other words, a follower accepts the compromise c only if his risk limit does not exceed the leader's resistance probability.
The mechanism H clari…es why the player with the lower risk limit is in a weak bargaining position and eventually concedes. In H , claims cannot be revised. Each As in Harsanyi's justi…cation of the Nash solution, players compete to be in a strong bargaining position by adjusting their claims to have the higher risk limit. The player i with the higher risk limit has the higher Nash product
, player i maximizes the Nash product of his claim, so that his risk limit is never below his opponent's. This claim ensures a strong bargaining position for incompatible claims.
None of the players can receive a payo¤ below his payo¤ in u N , as he would have a pro…table deviation. Hence, both players would propose u N as a leader and u N is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in H .
Proposition 2. The Nash solution u N is implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in the mechanism H without revisions of claims.
Proof. See appendix.
Discussion
The solutions of Nash and of Kalai and Smorodinsky are implemented in mechanisms with the same extensive form to be distinguished only by the extent to which claims can subsequently be revised. In both mechanisms …rst-mover advantage in stage 3 disappears in equilibrium since, respectively for c = m
However, the reason for achieving equality of risk limits in the two solutions is di¤erent. 
Bidding Resistance Probabilities: the Extended Nash Product
The minimal resistance probability needed by player i to impose his maximal revision
For all concessions in C i (p i ) other than player i's maximal revision, the opponent's risk limit exceeds i (p). We therefore say that the player with the higher minimal resistance probability is in a weak bargaining position because he, unlike his opponent, can no longer impose a compromise within his set of feasible compromises as a leader when his opponent bids a resistance probability strictly in between 1 (p) and 2 (p).
The characterization of the weak and the strong player by Harsanyi (1977) remains valid with revisions of claims by extending the concept of the Nash product. The extended Nash product and the Nash product coincide when no revisions are allowed.
For m 2 M, the claimp i which maximizes the unimodal extended Nash product of player i's claim is unique. A strong bargaining position is valuable in the competition for leadership. Recall that leadership is given to the player with label 1 in case both players bid equal resistance probabilities.
De…nition 3. The player with the label 1 for m 2 M is a player for whomp 1 
In case of equal maximized extended Nash products, any preferential treatment can be excluded by giving the label 1 to each player with equal probability.
De…nition 4. Player s is strong and player w is weak for claims p which are not strictly compatible
The characterization of the strong and weak player allows us to combine Harsanyi's approach with an emphasis on the importance of a strong bargaining position with
Moulin's approach with an emphasis on the competition for leadership. 3 As in Harsanyi, the strong player's strategic advantage is driven by the …rst-mover advantage of the player bidding lower resistance probability when maximal revisions are incompatible.
By bidding a resistance probability in between s (p) and w (p) in case (i) of De…nition 4, the strong player is strong enough to impose his maximal revision as a leader. If the weak player becomes leader by underbidding the strong player, the weak player's minimal resistance probability is too high for imposing his maximal revision. As a leader, the weak player proposes a compromise within the strong player's set of feasible compromises, which he prefers to the strong player's ultimatum, a lottery with as prizes the disagreement outcome and the outcome in which the strong player obtains his unrevised claim.
In case (ii) of De…nition 4, 1 (p) = 2 (p). By the labeling of the players, s = 1 for p. By the rule assigning leadership, L (q) = 1 for q 1 q 2 and L (q) = 2 for q 2 < q 1 :
If maximal revisions are incompatible for claims with equal extended Nash products, then only player 1's maximal revision can be implemented. However, player 2 can undo player 1's advantage and become strong by any small reduction of p 2 >p 2 or by claimingp 2 , unless player 1 has a claim for which he is strong for all claims of
In that case, existence of an equilibrium in the formulation of claims requires that a tie (q 1 = q 2 ) is resolved in favor of player 1.
If the proportional solution is a feasible compromise, any player can make sure that it is implemented by Moulin's maxmin bidding strategy of resistance. Since both players propose the same compromise as a leader, leadership and the labeling of the players does not matter. The proportional solution is a feasible compromise only if it is weakly preferred by the strong player to his maximal revision. This follows from
an immediate implication of (1), the monotonicity of r i (:; p i ) and q KS 1 (p) = q KS 2 (p). It follows that acquiring a strong bargaining position is valuable only if w (p) Proof. See appendix.
Formulating Claims: a Simple Demand Game
We now characterize the equilibrium claims in the …rst stage. By Lemma 1, the relevant set of compromises for claims which are not strictly compatible iŝ
If
p).
Formulating strictly compatible claims will not occur in equilibrium because player 2 has a pro…table deviation. For claims which are not strictly compatible, each player faces the trade-o¤ between increasing his claim -which increases his own payo¤ as the strong player -and reducing his claim -which may make him strong and which is valuable only if the proportional solution is not a feasible compromise. For p 0 such that p 0 i p i and p 0 i = p i , the following two inequalities determine the equilibrium claims,
By the …rst inequality of (3), player i prefers selecting his preferred allocation in C i (p) to leaving this choice to his opponent inĈ i (p). The …rst-mover advantage 
Implementing Bargaining Solutions
If the …rst weak inequality of (3) is satis…ed with equality forĈ 1 
with the following exceptions: The equilibrium claims are uniquely de…ned with the exception of subcases (a) and (c) of Proposition 3. If the strong player weakly prefers the maximal revision of his maximal claim to the proportional solution for some claim of the weak player which is not maximal, then this will also be the case for all larger claims of the weak player.
Unilateral Extension of Room to Compromise
We show that a negotiator cannot loose in equilibrium by facing fewer restrictions regarding the revisions he can make for identical maximal revision of his maximal claim. Consider the revision procedure m 1 ; m 2 2 M giving larger payo¤s to player 2 in the maximal revisions of player 1 than in m 1 ; m 2 2 M for claims below player 1's maximal claim. That is, player 1 is given more room to compromise in m than in
in the equilibrium with m, then player 1's extended Nash product is larger than 2's in m for the same p. Since extended Nash products are unimodal and p p, equality of the extended Nash products can be restored only for a higher claim of player 1 and a lower claim of player 2. In that case, the player giving himself more room to compromise is rewarded. Proof. See appendix.
Examples
We characterize the solutions for speci…c revision procedures and show how these vary when the revision procedures are adjusted in Example 1 and 2. We relate revision procedures to the literature in Example 3. 
is the maximal gain of his opponent he can tolerate. It follows that,
Again, as in Corollary 1, a negotiator never looses by facing fewer restrictions regarding the revisions of claims below his maximal claim. The more a negotiator is susceptible to feelings of frustration from unful…lled expectations, the less pro…cient he will be in negotiating. If a negotiator acts as an agent of a principal, the higher his fear of disappointing his principal, the less ambitious the targets set by his principal and the 7 The solution u of a revision procedure with scalar multiplication belongs to 
Robustness
In this section, we justify some of the simplifying features of the mechanism .
Player-speci…c revisions
We assumed that C 1 (p 1 )[C 2 (p 2 ) is the set of feasible compromises. That is, any opportunity for compromise available to one player is also available to the other player. We now consider player-speci…c revisions in~ when each player i must make compromises within his own set C i (p i ). This is the natural assumption in Example 3.
Player-speci…c revisions implement the same equilibrium allocation for the same revision procedure not only if u KS (1) 2 C 1 (1) \ C 2 (1), but also when restraint in the formulation of claims for obtaining a strong bargaining position equalizes the extended Nash products. In the latter case, none of the players can impose a compromise that is better than his maximal revision. The restriction of player-speci…c revisions has no bite. When subcase (a) of case (ii) in Proposition 3 does not hold, the extended Nash products are equalized and u =ũ: 9 When subcase (a) of case (ii) holds, the weak player can no longer propose in the strong player's set of feasible compromises and the strong player can impose compromises within his set of feasible compromises for his maximal claim. As in Nash demand games, the utility allocation implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium is no longer unique. The solutions are all Pareto-e¢ cient allocationsũ, giving utility not lower than p 2 m 2 1 (p 2 ) and not higher than m 1 2 (1). Proposition 4. Assume thatũ is an allocation implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in~ with player-speci…c revisions for m 2 M. Thenũ = u, where u is the solution in for m, unless u KS (1) = 2 C (1) and
Competition for leadership
We assumed that leadership is given to the player bidding the lower resistance probability against an uncompromising opponent who gives an ultimatum, as in Moulin's auction game. If leadership were given to the player with higher resistance probability, players could lead with maximal resistance against uncompromising followers. The follower would accept any compromise, including the leader's dictatorship, anticipating the disagreement outcome after rejection. Hence both players'bids and claims would be maximal in equilibrium. Schelling (1956) discusses bargaining with ultimatums. He argues that adherence to a commitment -leaving the negotiation table empty-handed -must be motivated and communicated, so that it is recognized by the other party. In particular, "the process of commitment may be a progressive one, the commitments acquiring their …rmness by a sequence of actions" (Schelling (1956), p. 296) . In that case, competition of leadership with and without bidding of resistance yields the same outcome. The equivalence between bidding resistance probabilities and the gradual buildup of resistance is similar to the equivalence between the sealed-bid …rst-price and the Dutch auction. Assume that after making claims both players increase resistance, simultaneously and at the same pace, until one of the players stops and proposes a compromise. A player takes the lead as soon as he is con…dent that his resistance probability to an uncompromising opponent is su¢ ciently high to impose his compromise. The equilibrium strategies when players bid for leadership or when resistance is built up until one player takes the lead yield the same resistance probability.
Alternating o¤ers
We …nally discuss ultimatums when the uncompromising follower has the option of continuing negotiations with a countero¤er, as in the alternating-o¤er game of Rubinstein (1982). Even if leadership alternates exogenously, adding ultimatums as an option of stopping negotiations induces restraint in the resistance probabilities as in the four-stage mechanism with competition for leadership. After formulating claims in the …rst stage in the extensive form , players take turns in making proposals in their compromise set until one player accepts his opponent's proposal or pursues his claim in an ultimatum. In line with Rubinstein's game, we focus on the revision procedure for which all revisions are feasible in the mechanism M . Hence players start with formulating maximal claims in order to maximize their payo¤s as followers in an ultimatum. The progressive process of commitment to a resistance probability in the follower's ultimatum is assumed to be time-consuming. The higher the probability of disagreement, the longer it takes to convince one's opponent of one's …rmness. 10 Player i's discounted payo¤ of the compromise c for the resistance probability q i is exp( "q i )c i for some positive ". Since delay is costly, the leader proposes as soon as he is con…dent that he can block an ultimatum.
For each element of a decreasing sequence of small positive ", consider a compromise proposal c i (") 2 P O (S) and resistance probability q i (") for each player i 2 N . For the compromises to be proposed and accepted in equilibrium, one needs
By the …rst equality in (4), accepting the opponent's o¤er c i (") is as good as waiting for a time "q i (") before proposing c i (") for all i 2 N . For equal waiting times "q i (") = "q i ("), the Nash products of the proposals are equal, as in Rubinstein's game. By the second equality in (4), accepting the opponent's compromise c i (") is as good as stopping with an ultimatum, in which case the initial claim is obtained with probability
Before player i can respond with a counterproposal or an ultimatum to the proposal c i ("), player i has built up a resistance probability q i (") = r i c i i (") ; 1 which deters an ultimatum, as in M .
By combining the equalities in (4) for both i 2 N , it follows that
For " ! 0, c 1 (") and c 2 (") converge to c , which by l'Hopital's rule satis…es
The lefthand side is increasing in c 1 and equal to 1 for c = u N . The righthand side is decreasing in c 1 and equal to 1 for c = u KS (1) : Hence, the compromise c lies strictly in between the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, unless both solutions coincide.
Assume that u N i > u KS i (1). The introduction of ultimatums in Rubinstein's alternating o¤er game moves the equilibrium solution away from the Nash solution towards the proportional solution. When the Nash solution is proposed as a compromise, player i's risk limit when pursuing his maximal claim is greater than player i's risk limit since u N i > u N i . Player i needs more time to build up the necessary resistance, so that his higher impatience inhibits him to obtain a compromise as good as u N . In Rubinstein's game, the player's impatience is exogenously determined by the waiting time for making a counterproposal. In M , the impatience of the players is endogenized by the choice of resistance. A player's impatience thus increases with his own payo¤ in his compromise proposal, as he requires a higher resistance to make this compromise acceptable.
Similarly, the introduction of alternating o¤ers in an extension of the four-stage mechanism with unrestricted revisions moves the equilibrium solution away from the proportional solution towards the Nash solution. Since the solution to M implies equal risk limits, its implementation in M would imply equal waiting times between alternating o¤ers equal to "q KS (1). However, for short equal waiting times, a com-promise is proposed and accepted only if the payo¤s are close to those in the Nash solution. Proposing an o¤er which deters ultimatums is necessary but not su¢ cient for its acceptance with an option to countero¤ers. The anticipation of countero¤ers with ultimatums results in unequal waiting times. The player preferring the proportional solution to the Nash solution will make a proposal which his opponent prefers to the proportional solution. As this reduces the opponent's risk limit, he can reduce his resistance needed to block an ultimatum below q KS (1) and thus the time he must wait before making his proposal.
Conclusion
We analyzed a simple, intuitive mechanism that implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players. The mechanism introduces ultimatums and the need to build resistance or to revise claims in a compromise in order to discourage negotiators to give ultimatums. We generate a whole family of solutions by varying the extent to which claims can be revised during the negotiations. The Nash solution is the unique equilibrium solution, if negotiators cannot revise claims. The ability to revise claims was assumed to be beyond the control of the negotiators in the course of negotiations. If a player has a claim for which he is strong for all claims of his opponent, then he gains by reducing the room for compromise for his maximal claim without jeopardizing his strong bargaining position. However in all other cases, if a negotiator were to suppress his feelings of frustration or if he did not fear to disappoint his principal by making large concessions, he would achieve better deals. In the evaluation of the performance of a negotiator, results loom larger than circumstances under which his results were achieved. Hence, it seems plausible that professional negotiators will strive for more room to maneuver. Similarly, principals will learn by experience to give discretionary power to their negotiators as to decide which concessions have to be made. If restrictions on revisions of claims other than maximal claims are loosened in con ‡icts between experienced negotiators, the predicted allocation would be the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Assuming that F accepts a compromise in a tie when c F = (1 q L )p F , by the de…nition of the risk limit for h 3 2 H 3 , a 4;
The leader L proposes the compromise c 2 C (p), which is accepted by F and gives L the largest payo¤, so that for h 2 2 H 2 ,
The choices a 2; (h 1 ) for h 1 2 H 1 and a 1; (h 0 ) in subgame-perfect equilibrium for R are given in Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
The mechanism M belongs to the class of mechanisms considered in Proposition
of Proposition 3 holds. We refer to the proof of the …rst case of Lemma 1 to show that players make the bids q = q KS (p) and the …rst case in Proposition 3 showing that u KS (1) is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The mechanism N belongs to the class of mechanisms considered in Proposition
The extended Nash product of a claim of a player in Proposition 3 is equal to the Nash product in that case. It is maximized forp i = u N i for i 2 N and the maximized values are equal for the two players. For
We refer to the proof of Lemma 1 for the bidding strategies with m 1 1 = p 1 and to the fourth case in Proposition 3 showing that u N is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We distinguish between four solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium implemented in one of the following four cases.
In the …rst case, exception (i) of Proposition 3 holds. The proportional solution is a feasible compromise for p = 1 and, by Lemma 1, u KS (1) is implemented. Let s be the strong player for p = 1. By Lemma 2, u KS s (1) for p w = 1 is a lower bound for s's payo¤. By its monotonicity, the proportional solution would remain feasible and would be implemented by Lemma 1 for a lower claim of player w, but would reduce w's payo¤. For p w = 1; the payo¤ of player s is bounded from above by u KS s (1) . Hence, u = u KS (1) is the unique solution for p = 1 in the …rst case. In the remaining cases, the proportional solution is not feasible for p = 1.
In the second case, subcase (a) or (c) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. In subcase (a), In the third case, condition (b) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. The extended Nash products are equal for p = ( p 1 ;p 2 ) ; so that player 1 is strong for p. Since the proportional solution is not feasible for p, m 1 ( p 1 ) is implemented by Lemma 1. Since p 2 =p 2 , player 1 remains strong for p 1 and all claims of player 2, so that player 1 never claims less than p 1 by Lemma 2. Remark that player 2 becomes strong forp 2 and any claim of player 1 exceeding p 1 . Player 1's payo¤ cannot be improved upon for the claimp 2 .
Hence, u = m 1 ( p 1 ) is the unique solution for p 1 andp 2 in the third case.
In the fourth case, the exceptions of Proposition 3 do not hold and there exists ( p 1 ;p 2 ) de…ning equal extended Nash products for which C 1 ( p 1 ) \ C 2 (p 2 ) 6 = ;. If Proof of Proposition 4.
Assume that condition (a) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. In the subgame for the claims p = (1;p 2 ), both players bid equal resistance probabilities in [ 1 (p) ; 2 (p)] and player 1 proposes c 2 C 1 (1) such that c 2 = (1 q 1 )p 2 which is as good as player 2's
is imposed, which bounds player 1's payo¤ from below. There are no pro…table deviations. Player 1 remains leader and proposes the same compromise for a higher resistance probability of player 2. Player 2 would lead if he lowers his or if player 1 increases his resistance probability. Either q 2 = q 1 = 2 (p), m 2 (p 2 ) is implemented and player 1 looses by increasing q 1 . Or player 2 is unable to impose a compromise in C 2 (p 2 ) and player 1 gives his ultimatum, giving a zero payo¤ to player 2 and, by concavity of Assume that condition (a) of (ii) of Proposition 3 does not apply. Then either
be implemented in~ for m. Sinceũ 2 P O (S), these lower bounds cannot be improved upon.
Proof of the Lemma' s
Proof of Lemma 1.
For any subgame with claims p which are not strictly compatible, u KS (p) is well 
The allocation would remain unchanged for a higher bid of player i 2 N , since player i would be the leader for q i and would propose u KS (p) which would be accepted by player i. The utility of a lower bidder i would be reduced. As a leader, either he proposes an acceptable o¤er which reduces his payo¤ by the monotonicity of r i (:; p i ) or he proposes an unacceptable o¤er yielding (1 q i ) u P i (p i ) u P i (p i ) < u KS (p) , s = L when player w chooses q w = s (p) and player s must propose in C w (p w ). Finally, for q s > w (p) if s = 1 and q s w (p) if s = 2, w = L for q w = w (p) and can propose in C w (p w ). Hence, if any player were to change his bidding strategy, his payo¤ would be lower than the one in m s (p s ). We conclude that m s (p s ) is implemented in equilibrium when the proportional solution is not feasible for p.
Proof of the Corollary
Proof of Corollary 1.
We distinguish between two cases. In the …rst case, condition (i) of Proposition 3 holds for m, so that u = u KS (1) 2 C (1). Since C (1)
C ( and m 2 = m 2 , this subcase also holds for m, so that u 1 = u 1 and p 1 = p 1 = 1.
In the second subcase, subcase (b) of Proposition 3 holds for m. Since player 2 remains weak for larger claims than p 2 , u 1 > u 1 . For p, the equality of the extended Nash products must be restored, either for p 2 =p 2 ; as in the second subcase or for m 1 ( p 1 ) = m 2 ( p 2 ) = u KS ( p). In both cases, p 1 > p 1 .
